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Lyrical and Theatrical Apostrophe, from Performing Actor 
to Textual Self
Frans-Willem Korsten
The previous chapters are all in dialogue, or in debate, with one of the most 
important studies to appear recently on the nature of the lyric, Jonathan 
Culler’s Theory of the Lyric (2015). In this epilogue I would like to deal with 
the pivot of these dialogues and debates: the nature of apostrophe as lyric 
address in terms of its either being read or heard. Rather than reviewing 
the excellent arguments brought forward in this volume, I would like to 
take the opportunity to trace the conceptual framework that informs 
Culler’s study and to see whether this may have caused some confusion 
about the status of his defĳ inition of apostrophe as the key marker of the 
lyric. I would also like to discuss the matter of translation, not unimportant 
in such a volume as the present one, and how this relates to forms of lyric 
address. When presented with studies on lyric address in ten famous or 
important medieval and early modern poems in Dutch, one could of course 
ask what happens with this address, or with address in general, if one takes 
into account how they involve diffferent historical forms of self. I would like 
to consider how the diffferent chapters in this book may have something 
systematic in common in their responses to Culler’s study, due the relation 
between self and collective. This will also lead me to reconsider the origin 
of apostrophe as a dramatic or theatrical one. I will do so in the light of 
a historical diffference that cannot be stressed enough, between poetry 
intended to be performed or to be read. Basically put, my question here is: 
might it be the case that the lyrical subject, as a self, comes to life only once 
poetry becomes something that instead of having to be performed turns 
into something to be published, printed and read? Finally I will ask what 
happens with modes of address when texts are translated, as they are here.
Structuralism and rhetoric
When in 1943 the German physicist Erwin Schrödinger held his famous 
series of lectures in Dublin that would later be published as What Is Life? The 
Physical Aspect of the Living Cell, he was suggesting to look for the smallest or 
182 FRANS-WILLEM KORSTEN 
most basic unit of biological life, just as in the previous decades physicists had 
been looking for the smallest or most basic unit in the inorganic world. In this 
endeavour, Schrödinger, who lived from 1887 to 1961, was clearly a child of his 
times, which had a similar interest in fĳinding the smallest or most basic units 
of language. Such was the goal of structuralism, which in its Eastern European 
variant was represented by the key fĳ igures of Roman Jakobson, René Wellek 
and Jan Mukařovský. In studying the way in which language functioned, one 
of their contentions was that the basic units of language remain the same 
whether one studies language synchronically or diachronically.
Jonathan Culler wrote a standard introduction to structuralism in the 
1970s: Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Litera-
ture (1975). Translating the logic of linguistic structuralism to the domain 
of literature, Culler’s key tenets were that, structurally speaking, literature 
has basic building blocks that likewise could be studied both synchronically 
and diachronically, and that these building blocks determine how literature 
functions. A telling quote from Structuralist Poetics is the one where Culler 
states that a structuralist approach to literature has the advantage of avoiding 
‘premature foreclosure – the unseemly rush from word to world – and stays 
within the literary system for as long as possible.’ Or, as he emphasizes, a struc-
turalist approach insists ‘that literature is something other than a statement 
about the world’ (Culler, 1975, p. 130). The very uncoupling of word and world 
necessarily follows from the claim that the basic structure of such a building 
block as lyric address remains the same synchronically and diachronically.
It may be clear, meanwhile, how Culler was as much a child of his times. The 
1970s was not only the heyday of French poststructuralism, and, in the US, of 
Paul de Man’s teaching at Yale, but also of a great interest in what could consti-
tute the aesthetic and political autonomy of literature. In this context, Culler’s 
defĳinition of the lyric should be considered as an attempt to defĳine the most 
basic forms of address operative in literature – synchronically, diachronically 
and functionally – within the poetic system. The lyric is distinct here from the 
other two basic generic modes, narrative and drama. In narrative someone 
is telling something in addressing an audience or a reader who cannot talk 
back; in drama the characters address one another; and in lyric the speaking 
subject is a ‘self’ addressing something else. Despite this structural defĳinition, 
the dominance of the three genres obviously goes back to Goethe who in 
1819 defĳined defĳined lyric, drama and epic (basically narrative in nature) as 
‘the three natural forms of poetry’.1 But then again, it has been argued that 
1  Goethe: ‘Es gibt nur drei echte Naturformen der Poesie: Die klar erzählende, die enthusiastisch 
aufgeregte und die persönlich handelnde: Epos, Lyrik und Drama’. In: Goethe, 1981, vol. 2, p. 187.
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modern theories on the lyric were ‘a project modern literary criticism took 
from the nineteenth century and made its own’ (Jackson & Prins, 2014, p. 2)
Tellingly, several contributors in this volume have paid attention to oc-
casional poetry, which is distinctly historical in that it is related to a specifĳic 
moment. It is a genre, moreover, that defĳ ies the notion of an ‘unseemly 
rush from word to world’, by its insistence on the connection of words 
to world. Culler’s defĳ inition of the lyric falters, in this context, because 
occasional poetry employs a double address: one that remains inside the 
literary system and one that by defĳ inition must step beyond it. A passage 
from a poem by Elizabeth Wolfff that Maaike Meijer cites in this volume 
may serve to illustrate this point. Wolfff describes the death of her husband 
to her friend Agatha Deken:
Oh DEKEN! DEKEN! Oh my husband Wolfff, dear man!
So late at night! – I sit down near his bed to read;
He talks, he dies, he falls into my arms! – I can
Not write now! – Heavens! Why was no one there with me?
L. 3 and 4 contain a double address. The apostrophe internal to the literary 
text calls upon ‘Heavens’ and poetically addresses the fĳ igure of the dying 
husband. In the domain of this apostrophe, the speaker is not writing. How 
could she: her husband has just dropped dead in her arms! At the same time, 
however, she is writing and she can write, namely to her best friend Deken, 
the other object of lyric address in this poem.
This should not lead to the conclusion, however, that Culler’s defĳ inition 
of lyric address misses the point. Rather, this is a matter of a shift in focus. 
Following the logic of structuralism, Culler’s defĳinition of the lyric is wilfully 
and functionally located within the domain of literature and language. 
Occasional poetry, however, seems to favour a defĳ inition of the lyric in 
rhetorical terms, with rhetoric demanding the connection of word to world. 
The discrepancy between the two foci forces us to assess how the character 
of the lyric, even in Culler’s abstract sense, can be historically anchored time 
and again. In this context, there might be a structurally and historically 
speaking functional element to the double address, an element related to 
the apostrophe’s dual origin. Even though in recent decades apostrophe 
has come to be seen as the hallmark of lyric poetry, its historical origin 
is rhetorico-theatrical, as the following will discuss. This has principal 
consequences for the status of the self.
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Address through time: diffferent sources of selves
This volume gathers a set of poems that are centuries apart in themselves, 
and centuries removed from the current situation. We move from the 
thirteenth century to the second half of the eighteenth, and in doing so 
we are dealing with rather diffferent lyrical genres: mystical love poetry 
(Hadewijch – Daróczi); elegy (Egidius – Strijbosch); a combination of a love 
and drinking song (‘Aenmerct’ – van der Poel); a sonnet (Hooft – Grootes); 
a laudatory poem (Vondel – Paijmans); a sonnet annex letter (Tesselschade 
– van Dijk); a consolatory poem (Six van Chandelier – Pieters); a love poem 
(Poot – Madelein); an occasional poem (Wolfff/Bekker – Meijer) and an 
ode (Bellamy – van der Haven). Clearly, these all imply diffferent modes of 
address. To modern readers, moreover, they may be difffĳ icult to experience 
or understand, for two reasons. The fĳ irst is that a substantial number of 
these poems was not so much meant to be read but to be heard. Three poems 
in this volume are actually songs (Daróczi, Strijbosch, van der Poel), and 
several of the poems were meant to be read out loud or performed or could 
both be read in silence and read out loud. Secondly, there is the breach of 
modernity and the redefĳinition of the self and consequent redefĳinition of 
the lyric that came with it. I will deal with the latter fĳ irst and come back to 
the diffference between performing and reading in the next section.
Charles Taylor, in Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity 
(1989), explored the consequences of so-called ‘expressivism’ in relation 
to the identity of the modern self. In defĳ ining modern identity, Taylor paid 
attention to three axes. The fĳ irst one concerns the value people attribute 
to, or the respect they have for (human) life, the second one concerns our 
ideas of what kind of life we think is worth living (one of the dominant 
questions in the historical avant-garde), the third is a matter of dignity in 
connection to societal roles. These three axes, in turn, organize the ways in 
which any self, in terms of identity, relates to the world. Such relations are 
substantially, at times incomprehensibly diffferent in diffferent cultures and 
times. In relation to lyrical apostrophe, historical diffferences concern the 
favourite themes that are being called upon, or likely and unlikely themes; 
they concern the nature of the ‘calling upon’, for instance when the border 
between poem and prayer is porous; and most importantly, they concern 
the nature or identity of the speaking self in its relation to the world. In this 
volume several contributions address this issue of the historical specifĳ icity 
of subjectivity, notably Britt Grootes.
The diffferent ideas on what the lyric historically means and implies 
in terms of subjectivity, and how this relates to modern theories, were 
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at the centre of a volume edited by Virginia Jackson & Yopie Prins, The 
Lyric Theory Reader: A Critical Anthology. In the introduction to the second 
part of their book they write: ‘while the previous section (…) showed the 
consolidation of lyric as a genre through twentieth-century genre-theory, 
this section demonstrates how that idea has been projected back into liter-
ary history’ (Jackson & Prins, 2014, p. 86). Such projection backwards may 
be a straightforward form of anachronism, but may also be a problem of 
diffferent forms of self that relate to diffferent media.
Let me take one song in this volume to address the issue, the one from the 
mid-sixteenth century, discussed by Dieuwke van der Poel, that starts with:
Come hear my sad complaint,
You knaves with hearts carefree.
I grieve both day and night
And moan ‘Oh, woe is me!’
And surely I may grieve,
For one I saw that day
Has pierced my heart with love.
The historical anchors of the poem are defĳ ined by van der Poel as fol-
lows. Firstly, thematically speaking the song harks back to the medieval 
times of roaming knights: ‘sometimes indeed as soldiers but more often 
as romanticized adventurers, lower-class heroes and embodiments of 
virility: the images range from spirited lads to lusty rogues and sometimes 
even downright malevolent rapists.’ Secondly, these fĳ igures from another 
world came to stand at the centre of poems and songs to a sixteenth-
century bourgeois audience. To make the historical gap between the 
two understandable, van der Poel suggests that Westerns play a similar 
role to current audiences. The comparison surely helps. Yet, it is of 
course a translation that does not and perhaps cannot explain how a 
mid-sixteenth-century audience would use and experience medieval 
themes that were taken up in contemporary modes of address. In terms 
of historical diffferences, a third element is that there was this specifĳ ic 
company in which and for which the poem was performed: a company 
of rhetoricians. Fourthly, the poem or song started to travel to a wider 
audience, or rather audiences. Fifthly, the melody of the song could be 
used to propel other texts. In this case, the medieval secular love poem 
was being changed into a sixteenth-century devotional one. In all cases 
the poem/song functioned not so much to allow for individual expression, 
but to facilitate collective bonding.
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One could be tempted to consider one of the most distinctive diffferences 
between modern lyric and lyric from earlier times to be the opposition 
between individual self and collective. Yet such an opposition is false, as we 
will see in the next session. What this example fĳ irst and foremost suggests 
is that it is very much the question whether any historical self has a source 
comparable to the modern one, and whether this self is the source of the 
lyrical text. The individual texts dealt with by van der Poel are not unique 
expressions, with unique apostrophes, meant to be read. Rather, they are 
flexible ones, facilitating several modes of address in relation to diffferent 
situations and audiences, but all in terms of performance. For Taylor, the 
modern self relates to art in the sense that the hidden nature of the modern 
self can be brought forward, or can be called upon, by means of expression, 
and lyric would be the paradigmatic case of such expression. Yet, in earlier 
forms of lyric any hidden nature is not the subject’s source, nor the thing to 
be called upon. In the case of this text, for instance, there is more reason 
to consider the melody, rather, as the source of diffferent textual versions 
throughout decades. It is one that is not hidden at all. Rather it offfers dif-
ferent selves a medium to tap into. The very issue of music, as a matter of 
performance, brings us back to the pivot of address.
Expressivism: confusing prosopopeia with self
Taylor’s studied Romanticism as the conceptual cradle of the idea that the 
modern self has an inner source (in nature) that allows it to appear as authen-
tic and in that context specifĳied this source as an ‘inner voice’. It concerns 
a voice, then, that comes out of some ‘inner’ and that as such runs counter 
to a voice that is taken from someone else, as when someone is speaking 
from behind a mask, or takes on someone else’s voice. In her response to 
Taylor’s work, Victoria Fareld defĳined expressivism as an ‘embrace’, namely 
of ‘something that precedes and exists independently of the expression itself, 
as well as something that is brought into being in and by the expression itself’ 
(Fareld, 2007, p. 171). One of the things previously existing independently 
of the expression itself, that precedes it, is of course the language used to 
express something with. It is this previous existence that links any voice, 
any speaking subject, or any lyrical subject, intrinsically to a collective of 
subjects that is always being addressed implicitly through or by means of 
any self expressing itself. In this context we have to reconsider the origins 
of apostrophe in drama and its distinctly rhetorical nature following from 
those origins.
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In a pivotal study by Stephen Usher the use of apostrophe by orators is 
traced back to the fourth century BCE in classical Greece. Usher’s study was 
again of relevance to David Sansone, who in Greek Drama and the Invention 
of Rhetoric considered the apostrophe in its efffective dramatic use. Here, 
both dramatically and rhetorically speaking, the apostrophe indicates the 
turning away from one party addressed to another party, for instance from 
an actor to the audience, or from one character to another, etc. Apostrophe 
literally means: ‘to turn’ (stréphein) ‘away’ or ‘aside’ (apo). This theatrical and 
rhetorical nature of apostrophe is then both historically and systematically 
connected to the domain of law. As for the apostrophe’s efffect, there is a 
principal link, here, with the system of justice, that has been dealt with in 
theories of expressivism as well. The basic question is whether law only has 
to solve legal issues case per case, serving the individual needs of people, or 
whether any case and verdict always speaks doubly, in turning away from 
the parties concerned in court to an audience at large.2 And obviously, any 
court case itself is dramatic and theatrical in nature. It involves a distinct set 
of roles and players: the accused, the judge presiding, a lawyer defending and 
either an accuser or an offfĳicer of prosecution. In some cases there will be a 
jury. Next, there is the audience present to witness, of which many will have a 
distinct interest in the case. All these parties will have to be addressed at some 
point, but since they are all there, within the very same space, all roles and 
players involved will always hear what is being said, even when they are not 
addressed explicitly. Apostrophe has its origin in this context and structure.
Quintilian in his Institutes of Oratory deals with it, fĳ irst in the context of a 
court case, and then together with the fĳigure of parenthesis. In the fĳirst case 
he defĳines it in a remarkably ambiguous way, as a ‘diversion’, a ‘digression’ or 
a ‘calling upon’. The fĳirst concerns the rhetorical attack on an adversary, the 
second an appeal, the third a prosopopoeia (Quintilian, book IX, chapter 2:38). 
What connects apostrophe with parenthesis for Quintilian, consequently, 
is that the parenthesis equally implies a diffferent address (book IX, chapter 
3:23). Here as well, what is said in-between, between brackets, involves an-
other addressee. It is in turning away, then, to another addressee in the full 
knowledge that the one addressed previously is still able to hear this all, that 
the ‘extraordinary efffect,’ or the rhetorical power of apostrophe, comes about.3
2  On this see Adler, 2000. Adler deals especially with those who have favourably considered 
expressivism in law, such as Elizabeth Anderson, Robert Cooter, Dan Kahan, Larry Lessig & 
Richard Pildes. On a defence of expressivism in law, see Strudler, 2001. 
3  Longinus, in his study on the sublime, also emphasizes how the change of person has a 
‘vivid efffect’ (Longinus, 1991, pp. 200-201).
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The dynamics in play, consequently, concern two pivotal issues in relation 
to self and address. Prosopopeia is the fĳ igure that allows an actor, an orator, 
a speaker or writer to communicate by speaking as someone or something 
else. In the cases dealt with in this volume the most pronounced example 
is the poem by Six van Chandelier (Pieters), where the voice is leant to the 
dead father. Likewise, when an orator in court suddenly calls out ‘O Porcian 
and Sempronian laws’, he is clearly calling upon something but not as a self. 
He takes the voice of another. Secondly the distinction in play in terms of 
addressed is not one between something or someone being addressed and 
an audience not being addressed. There is a simultaneous double address. 
In her evaluation of Taylor’s analysis of the modern self, Seyla Benhabib 
(2002) argues that two metaphors dominate Taylor’s analysis of identity: 
horizon and web of interlocution. Taken together they both imply that ‘The 
answer to the question of who I am always involves reference to “where” 
I am speaking from and to whom or with whom’ (Benhabib, 2002, p. 145). 
In the context of this volume on lyric address, one could very well wonder 
whether this basic structure is specifĳ ic to the modern self in terms of its 
desire to answer the question: ‘Who am I?’ What the theatrical apostrophe 
captures is how an address within one world, a world staged within a certain 
horizon, always concerns a staged voice that relates a self to a collective that 
may not be addressed explicitly, but is explicitly present, well aware that it 
is connected to the one speaking by a web of interlocution.
In the context of the role of the witness, I came to defĳ ine the doubleness 
of theatrical apostrophe as a form of ‘not-being-there in being-there’ or the 
simultaneous realization of two modes of address: address of attention and 
address of expression (Korsten, 2012). In witnessing something, someone 
is not a witness yet (in the sense of bearing witness) but addressing what is 
happening (the focus of attention) with an eye on subsequent expression. 
Once bearing witness is in play, this duality reverses. In bearing witness, 
someone is no longer witnessing something concretely; what was addressed 
by means of attention is now being expressed. Sequentially, this means that 
someone must have paid attention fĳ irst to what happened; and in bearing 
witness, consequently, performs a double address: one to the matter that 
is being witnessed, the other to the subjects to whom such matters are 
testifĳ ied. This double address is also at stake, I think, in these medieval 
and early modern poems.
The introduction and opening chapter of this volume discusses a thir-
teenth century song by Hadewijch. As Aniko Daróczi duly notes, the poem 
would have been sung (to the melody of the chanson S’Amours veut que mes 
chans remaigne by the trouvère Blondel le Nesle). In this context Daróczi’s 
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principal point is that the defĳ inition of Hadewijch’s texts by scholar Josef 
van Mierlo as poems, should be amended (see note 1 of her chapter). They 
were songs, as Veerle Fraeters & Frank Willaert also argued in their 2009 
edition of the songs. My point is that this implies a double address in the 
reversed sense of the witness. The singer wants to express something, in the 
sense of lyrically calling upon something, but does so in paying attention 
to the audience, which she addresses in terms of attention. So how would 
this afffect our reading of the fĳ inal stanza’s opening lines?
So he who hopes for Love’s saving grace
should spare no efffort, no cost, no loss.
He must persevere through trials he’ll face
in arduous labours for Love’s high cause.
If we read this only in terms of address through language, there appears to 
be a lyrical apostrophe à la Culler in play. A lyrical subject calls upon a ‘he 
who hopes for Love’, with an audience overhearing it. So, the apostrophe 
stands, whether a ‘you’ is explicitly called upon or not. No mistake, Culler’s 
ideas on lyrical apostrophe concern a triangulation. Yet J. Douglas Kneale 
(1991 and 1995) argued that in his focus on voice, self and address, Culler 
basically confused apostrophe with prosopopeia. Again, this is the rhetorical 
fĳ igure that allows an actor, an orator, a speaker or writer to communicate 
by speaking as someone or something else. The lyrical ‘I’, so Douglas Kneale 
argues, is not an expressing self, it is an ‘I’ that is a mask. It can only be 
confused with a self, so I argue, once poetry becomes something to be 
expressed through writing and print, and consequently something to be 
read. Then the theatrical dynamic falls away and a self with an inner voice 
seems to appear, by means of apostrophe.
Whereas Culler appears to be dealing with poetry fĳ irst and foremost as 
something to be read – a modern idea of poetry – poetry has mostly been 
sung by a singer, addressing an audience, and this singer is not the self. 
Moreover, formally and due to the conflation of language with music, a 
dynamic of time in the theatrical apostrophe – addressing one party fĳ irst 
and then another – is being fused in the lyrical apostrophe. This formal 
fusion has principal implications for self and collective, for two reasons. 
Music itself is not vectorized in terms of an address. Music sur-rounds all 
those present, as has been pointed out in the introduction in reference to 
the work of Heinz Schlafffer, whose quote is worth repeating here: ‘Wer den 
Gesang hört, hat an dessen Macht teil (…)’ (Schlafffer, 2012, p. 76): ‘Whomever 
hears the song, takes part in its power.’ Still, music must in turn also be 
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distinguished from the singer, a fĳ igure analogous to but also diffferent from 
the lyrical subject. The singer is a theatrical fĳ igure, not a self calling upon 
something in a text to be read, and it is this musico-theatrical fĳ igure that is 
able to address an audience, changing it from an audience that overhears to 
an audience addressed as a collective. If the lyrical subject can only speak 
because language, as the embodiment of the collective, enables it to speak, 
the lyrical subject as a singer is able to address this collective explicitly. 
As such it is not just calling upon an audience in a lyrical way, calling it to 
life, but it is calling upon its potential to respond. The theatrical origin of 
the apostrophe relates to response-ability, that is, which is less an aesthetic 
than an ethical category.
Untranslatability and lyrical apostrophe
Whatever the precise nature of the poems gathered here, they are all 
translated, not just in time but also in terms of language. The issue of 
linguistic translation brings in a specifĳ ic problematic for the defĳ inition 
of apostrophe and the lyric. Let me uncouple the issue from the historical 
examples presented in this volume by bringing in a contemporary poem/
song that can also be seen as an explicit address to an audience.
In 2014, the Dutch spoken-word artist Typhoon (Glenn de Randamie) 
released a new album entitled Lobi da Basi. In the Dutch context the 
title of the album was a clear sign of its being situated in the context of 
Randamie’s Surinamese background. Although the rest of the album is 
in Dutch, the title suggests that a Dutch audience, or rather Dutch audi-
ences, should perhaps understand the Dutch language in a new or diffferent 
light, following a diffferent rhythm, and referring to a diverse and broad 
idea of Dutchness. The very fĳ irst song is titled ‘We zijn er’, which, for the 
time being, I will translate as ‘We are here’ (as we shall see, it is almost 
impossible to translate the phrase adequately). This title is connected to 
a central theme in this song, which is apparent in lines such as: ‘To the 
underground, chased by dogs, waiting in the water, head below level so 
that they lose track’; an explicit reference to the way in which slaves who 
had run away were chased. An implicit reference, a little later is: ‘I am 
going wild, fĳ ind peace in our history, although, thoughts of pain pop up’.4 
4 ‘Naar de ondergrondse, achtervolgd door honden, wachtend in het water. Koppie onder 
zodat ze het spoor bijster raken’ and ‘Ik vind rust in onze historie al poppen de pijngedachtes 
op’. From the song ‘We zijn er’, Lobi da basi, 2014.
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In the context of this indeed painful colonial history, the title becomes a 
self-conscious statement. The approximately 350,000 people who since 
Surinam’s independence chose to remain Dutch or came to the Netherlands 
are not to be ignored or marginalized or wished away as an awkward 
colonial leftover. They are ‘here’.
In terms of the lyric the phrase ‘We are here’ is an apostrophe calling 
upon this ‘we’. The apostrophe is distinctly Dutch in its address, partly 
because of the specifĳ ic Dutch circumstances, but more basically because 
of Dutch language. The Dutch phrase ‘We zijn er’ is untranslatable in the 
sense of Barbara Cassin, and Emily Apter in her wake.5 The untranslatable, 
here, is not meant to imply that words or phrases in a specifĳ ic language 
are impossible to translate, but refers to how certain words and phrases 
constantly provoke new attempts at translation because an ultimately 
adequate translation does not exist. In the case of the Dutch phrase ‘We 
zijn er’ the short adverb ‘er’ is indistinctive, or only becomes meaningful 
in the context of a sentence. ‘We zijn er’ can mean: ‘We are here’ or ‘We 
are there’, but it can also mean ‘We have arrived’, as when for instance 
slaves on the run could say they had arrived as soon as they were in safety. 
Most literally, the phrase can even mean: ‘We are er’, when the verb is 
considered a copula and the ‘er’ becomes a predicative. This may seem 
strange or absurd but something similar is the case in a poem by the 
Dutch poet Lucebert:
Here is I and there is
a name here in
one understands the air
but not man6
In this case as well, the phrase in the original ‘er is ik en er is’ appears to 
be untranslatable, with our having to choose between ‘here’ and ‘there’ 
and losing the connotations of the Dutch phrase that the ‘I’ may be an ‘er’.
This may all seem something internal to Dutch language. Yet the very 
fact of untranslatability suggests something else. The specifĳ icity of this 
address is only understandable to a Dutch audience. That is: the apostrophe, 
5  See Cassin’s Vocabulaire européen des philosophies: Dictionnaires des intraduisibles or the 
later Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon. Not so much the philosophical but 
the political implications of the issue, specifĳ ically in the scholarly and literary domain, were 
explored in Apter, 2013.
6  Er is ik en er is / daarin een naam / de lucht verstaat men / maar de mens niet’. (Lucebert, 
2002, p. 62).
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here, addresses a ‘we’ but the way in which it addresses this ‘we’ is only 
understandable to the ones who, in Culler’s conceptualization, are suppos-
edly positioned as the ones who ‘overhear’. To Culler, the ‘self’ is central, 
both as the one who calls the things into being that it addresses and as 
the one who, simultaneously, calls itself into being. It does so, however, in 
a specifĳ ic language, targeting a collective audience that is addressed. The 
‘self’ expressing itself is well aware that others are listening in and that 
indeed without those others it would not be able to speak in the fĳirst place. 
Or, the self implicitly addresses the collective that enables it to speak as a 
necessary and inevitable connotation. It is like when Typhoon states ‘When 
I make music, I have to feel it, it has to resonate’.7 In the case of spoken-
word artists, this involves both language and music proper. To be able to 
express things adequately this self is in need of itself as a sensory, sensing 
and sensible unit and in need of a connection with something else, as the 
very term ‘resonate’ suggests. The two combined are, of course, historically 
and culturally specifĳ ic.
If in this volume medieval and early modern texts are translated into 
English, this is efffectively a form of prosopopeia. They have come to speak 
through the fĳ igure of another language. At the same time they have made 
use of theatrical apostrophes, in turning away from the collective to which 
they were addressed in order to address other collectives. Meanwhile, in 
reading them, we can see how they are apostrophic in calling upon things, 
subjects, feelings, as a result of which we might imagine that we hear histori-
cal selves speaking.
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